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ABSTRACT
Aim To systematically review, using a qualitative, narrative synthesis approach, papers examining alcohol industry
efforts to inﬂuence alcohol marketing policy, and compare with those used by the tobacco industry.Methods Literature
searches were conducted between April and July 2011, and updated in March 2013. Papers were included if they: made
reference to alcohol industry efforts to inﬂuence (a) policy debates concerningmarketing regulations, (b) new speciﬁcmar-
keting policies or (c) broad alcohol policy which included marketing regulations; were written in English; and concerned
the period 1990–2013. Alcohol industry political activity was categorized into strategies/tactics and frames/arguments.
Data extraction was undertaken by the lead author and 100% of the papers were fully second-reviewed. Seventeen papers
met the review criteria. Results Five main political strategies and ﬁve main frames were identiﬁed. The alcohol industry
argues against marketing regulation by emphasizing industry responsibility and the effectiveness of self-regulation,
questioning the effectiveness of statutory regulation and by focusing on individual responsibility. Arguments relating to
industry responsibility are often reinforced through corporate social responsibility activities. The industry primarily
conveys its arguments through manipulating the evidence base and by promoting ineffective voluntary codes and
non-regulatory initiatives. Conclusions The alcohol industry’s political activity is more varied than existing models of
corporate political activity suggest. The industry’s opposition to marketing regulation centres on claims that the industry
is responsible and that self regulation is effective. There are considerable commonalities between tobacco and alcohol in-
dustry political activity, with differences due potentially to differences in policy contexts and perceived industry legitimacy.
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INTRODUCTION
Understanding how large corporations seek to shape
health policy has been considerably advanced by the re-
lease of millions of internal tobacco industry (TI) docu-
ments following litigation in the United States (US) [1–3].
More than 850 peer-reviewed papers [4] have now been
published examining TI political activity, including a
growing number of systematic reviews [5–7], which
provide detailed overviews of how the TI seeks to inﬂuence
policy. Research on alcohol industry (AI) political activity is
more case-study based and, without access to previously
conﬁdential industry documents, awareness of the AI’s
political activity is less developed [8,9]. This is reﬂected in
differences in how public institutions, such as the World
Health Organization (WHO), engage with the TI and AI.
With regard to the TI, Article 5.3 of theWHO’s Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC, the WHO’s ﬁrst
global public health treaty) requires all Parties to protect
health policies ‘from commercial and other vested interests
of the tobacco industry’ [10] and guidelines for this Article
identify the need to actively monitor and expose TI conduct
[11]. By contrast, the WHO’s approach to the AI is more
ambiguous; highlighting the importance of protecting the
development of health policies from ‘commercial or vested
interests’ [12] on one hand, while allowing AI participa-
tion [13] on the other. This is despite research illustrating
parallels between the political activities of ‘Big Tobacco’
and ‘Big Booze’ [14].
This paper aims to systematically review the tactics
(political techniques) and arguments the AI uses to inﬂu-
ence public policy relating to alcohol marketing. This focus
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is chosen for two reasons. First, AI marketing is known to
signiﬁcantly inﬂuence drinking initiation and prevalence
[15–18], and restrictions on alcohol marketing are a key
element of alcohol control [19–21]. Second, it provides a
basis for making comparisons with TI efforts to inﬂuence
marketing policies which were systematically reviewed in
a paper published in 2014 [5]. The TI review built on
existing methods for categorizing corporate political activ-
ity in the management literature [22] by classifying both
the strategies/tactics and frames/arguments the TI uses
in efforts to oppose marketing policies. The present paper
develops and applies the TI framework to the AI. It aims
to provide a tool for public health advocates and
policymakers to understand, predict and potentially coun-
ter the AI’s efforts to inﬂuence alcohol policy. Our approach
responds to a recent recommendation that ‘investigations
of the strategies of alcohol industry actorsmay beneﬁt from
comparisons with other industries, and particularly with
the tobacco industry’ [23].
METHODS
This review aimed to identify all papers (based on either
primary or secondary data) that examined AI attempts to
inﬂuence marketing regulation from 1990 to 2013. The
AI comprises large multi-national companies and tiny spe-
cialist brewers, and both on- and off-trade businesses (sales
for consumption ‘on’ the premises and ‘off ’ the premises,
respectively). In this review we include tactics and argu-
ments used by alcohol producers or groups representing
producers. Marketing encompasses ﬁve key variables:
product, promotion, price, place and person [24]. Political
activity in respect of tax (which affects price) was excluded
from the TI systematic review [5] as a systematic review of
TI inﬂuence on tobacco tax had already been completed
[6], so for comparative purposes it was also excluded from
this review. However, efforts to inﬂuence minimum unit
pricing of alcohol were included under price.
The databases Web of Knowledge (which includes Web
of Science, BIOSIS Previews and MEDLINE), Business
Source Premier and Embase were searched using the
string: (corporat* OR industr* OR compan* OR busines*
OR ﬁrm*) AND (alcohol OR drink) AND (marketing OR
advertis* OR sponsor*) AND (regulat* OR policy OR
legislat*). The search engine Google was used to identify
grey literature and experts were contacted to identify any
additional literature (more information is available in the
supporting information, Appendix S1). All searches were
conducted between April and July 2011, andwere updated
inMarch 2013. Searches were limited to papers from 1990
to 2013 and those written in English. The search protocol
was developed in conjunction with a qualiﬁed librarian.
Initial study inclusion/exclusion criteria were piloted
and were discussed extensively between all three authors.
The ﬁnal inclusion/exclusion criteria used in this review
can be seen in Box 1. In total, 917 papers were identiﬁed,
670 of which were excluded based on their title and ab-
stract alone. 239 papers were downloaded for full analysis
(eight papers could not be located despite efforts to contact
the authors). 222 papers were excluded for not meeting
the inclusion criteria. The remaining 17 papers met all
the criteria and were included within the review.
Box 1 Inclusion and exclusion criteria
To be included in this review, studies and individual
arguments/tactics had to fulﬁl the following criteria:
• Studies must be written in English.
• Studies must cover the period from 1990 to 2013. In
papers that cover both before and after 1990, only
those tactics/arguments relating to post-1990 will
be recorded and included within this review.
Political activity prior to 1990 is excluded to enable
valid comparisons with the ﬁndings of our earlier
review on the TI [5].
• Studies must look at AI efforts to inﬂuence (a) policy
debates concerning marketing regulations generally,
(b) new speciﬁc marketing policies or (c) broader
alcohol policy within which marketing is included
(information regarding how the industry attempts
to circumvent existing regulation will not be
included within the review).
• The tactics/arguments covered must be related to
one or more of the following: product (for example,
packaging, new products/ﬂavours, branding), price*
(for example, price promotions, minimum pricing),
promotion (advertising including billboards, point-
of-sale, sponsorship), place (for example, restrictions
on advertising near schools) or person (for example,
restrictions on advertising or selling to youth).
• Each individual claim made regarding AI
tactics/arguments used to inﬂuence marketing
regulation must be supported directly by veriﬁable
evidence (either a clear citation that could be
veriﬁed by the authors or a direct quote from an AI
ofﬁcial or industry afﬁliated body).
• Tactics/arguments identiﬁed must be implemented
directly by the AI or by a group where
substantiated evidence suggests that they act on the
AI’s behalf.
• Tactics/arguments which are noted within the
included papers are assumed to have been carried
through, in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
Tactics/arguments which are shown to only have
been planned, and not used, will not be recorded.
• Only tactics/arguments directly related to marketing
regulation will be recorded. For example, health
warning labels are included as they inﬂuence the
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means of packaging as a marketing tool, but they are
excluded if the study only looks at, for example, the
wording of the warning, as this does not affect
marketing.
• Only tactics/arguments that are clearly detailed in
the paper(s) are coded.
*Price in the form of tax has been excluded because
tax-related lobbying was excluded from the systematic
review of TI political activity [5], and we aimed to
make the TI and AI reviews comparable. Price in
terms of price-based promotions have been included.
Data extraction (supporting information, Appendix S1)
was undertaken by the lead author, and 100% of the in-
cluded papers were second-reviewed by either the second
or third author to check that all the inclusion criteria were
met and to agree tactic and argument categorization. Any
differences were discussed between all three authors.
Disagreements related only to categorization, more often
in relation to the categorization of arguments than tactics.
Where disagreement occurred, all evidence falling under
that particular category was re-reviewed by all three
authors until agreement had been reached. Narrative
synthesis was undertaken to combine the evidence from
the papers.
Unlike the TI review [5] which was based solely on
secondary data, this review is based on both primary and
secondary data. Primary data came predominantly from
a United Kingdom (UK) parliamentary inquiry into alcohol
where four producers and their communications agencies
were asked to provide documents relating to ﬁve brands
and were questioned by Members of Parliament from the
Health Select Committee; many additional companies,
trade groups and social aspect organizations (SAOs) also
provided written evidence [25–27]. Additionally, due to a
lack of evidence focusing speciﬁcally on AI efforts to inﬂu-
ence marketing regulations, the review was expanded to
include AI inﬂuence on marketing policy debates alongside
their inﬂuence on speciﬁc marketing regulations, as per
the TI review [5].
Framework of classiﬁcation
AI political activity was divided into ‘strategies’ containing
individual ‘tactics’ (the methods by which a corporation
attempts to exert inﬂuence) and ‘frames’ containing indi-
vidual ‘arguments’ (the reasons given by a corporation as
to why they oppose one idea or support another). The
system of classiﬁcation developed in an earlier systematic
review of TI political activity [5] (which, in turn, had been
based partly onHillman &Hitt’s paper [22]) was used as an
initial framework to code AI political activity. Coding cate-
gories (strategies/tactics and frames/arguments) were
amended and developed via ‘emergent coding’ [28]. This
was an iterative process, and the frameworks were only
ﬁnalized after all of the papers had been reviewed as
described above. Once the framework of political activity
was ﬁnalized, the strategies/tactics and frames/arguments
used by the AI were compared to those identiﬁed in the
systematic review of TI political activity [5].
The geographical distribution of where tactics and ar-
guments were usedwas also recorded. If the paper included
was transnational, the geography of where the individual
tactics and arguments were used was listed. For example,
the paper by Casswell & Thamarangsi [29] is a transna-
tional study, but the ‘free market economy’ argument
was used in France.
RESULTS
Geography
In total, 17 papers met our inclusion criteria. A quarter
(24%) of the papers focused on Europe, and a further
quarter (24%) were transnational (Table 1). No papers
focused on AI conduct in South America.
Arguments and tactics
AI tactics used to inﬂuence marketing regulation
This review identiﬁed 20 separate tactics falling under ﬁve
main strategies (Table 2), which we have termed as follows:
‘information’ (providingormisrepresenting evidence), ‘con-
stituency building’ (forming alliances with other sectors,
organizations, or the public to give the impression of larger
support for the industry’s position), ‘policy substitution,
development and implementation’ (proposing, supporting
or helping to implement alternative policies), ‘legal’ (using
the legal system) and ‘ﬁnancial incentive or disincentive’
(offering direct or indirect monetary incentives or
Table 1 Geographical location of papers.
Geographical
location
Number of
papers (%) Papers
Africa 2 (12%) Sub-Saharan Africa [30]; South
Africa [31]
Asia 1 (6%) Thailand [32]
Australasia 3 (18%) Australia [33–35]
Europe 4 (24%) UK [27,36]; Netherlands [37];
Ireland [38]
North America 3 (18%) USA [28,39]; Canada and USA [40]
Transnational 4 (24%) Transnational [29,41,42];
Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development
(OECD) [43]
Total 17
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Table 2 Strategies and tactics used by the alcohol industry when attempting to inﬂuence marketing regulation.
Strategy
Tactic
Total number of
papers, by geographya
(total number of
uses identiﬁed)
Information (32) Direct lobbying (meetings and correspondence with legislators/policymakers) Africa – 4
[30][30][30][30]
Asia – 1
[32]
Europe – 1
[38]
Indirect lobbying (using third parties, including front groups, to lobby on the
industry’s behalf)
Africa – 4
[30][30][30][30]
Establishing industry/government collaboration (e.g. via working group,
technical group, advisory group)/work alongside policymakers providing
technical support/advice/policy development or implementation
Africa – 4
[30][30][30][30]
Evidence Adding to the evidence
base or shaping its
understanding
Commissioning, writing
(or ghost writing) or
disseminating research/
publicationsb
Asia – 1
[32]
Europe – 1
[27]
Transnational – 1
[42]
Preparing position papers,
technical reports or data on
impacts (including economic
impact studies)
Asia – 1
[32]
Europe – 1
[38]
Transnational – 1
[42]
Selective citation of industry-
favourable evidence
Europe – 2
[27][27]
Transnational – 1
[42]
Omission of evidence Africa – 4
[30][30][30][30]
Removing troubling phrases Transnational – 1
[42]
Contesting nature of the evidence Europe – 3
[27][27][27]
Transnational – 1
[42]
Constituency
building (16)
External constituency building Forming alliances with and
mobilising other industry
sectors/business/trade organizations
Asia – 1
[32]
N. America – 1
[28]
Transnational – 2
[31,41]
Media advocacy (press releases,
publicity campaigns, public hearings,
interviews)
Asia – 1
[32]
Europe – 1
[38]
(Continues)
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Table 2. (Continued)
Strategy
Tactic
Total number of
papers, by geographya
(total number of
uses identiﬁed)
Forming alliances with or mobilising
unions/civil society organizations/
consumers/employees/the public
Asia – 1
[32]
N. America – 1
[28]
Creation of front groups/astroturf/
social aspect organizations
Asia – 2
[32][32]
N. America – 1
[28]
Internal constituency building Collaboration between companies/
development of pan-industry group
or industry trade associationc
Asia – 1
[32]
Europe – 2
[27,36]
Transnational – 2
[41,42]
Policy substitution,
development and
implementationd (28)
Developing/promoting non-
regulatory initiative (generally seen
to be ineffective/less effective, e.g.
education programmes)
Africa – 4
[30][30][30][30]
Europe – 3
[27][27][27]
N. America – 2
[28,40]
Transnational – 1
[42]
Developing/promoting (new or
existing) voluntary code/self-regulation
Africa – 4
[30][30][30][30]
Asia – 1
[32]
Australasia – 1
[35]
Europe – 6
[27][27][27][36][37][38]
N. America – 1
[28]
Transnational – 1
[29]
Developing regulation from scratch
and planning implementation
Africa – 4
[30][30][30][30]
Legal (3) Using litigation/raising the prospect
of legal action
Asia – 1
[32]
Europe – 1
[29]
Shaping international law Transnational – 1
[29]
Financial incentive or disincentive (1) Threatening ﬁnancial withdrawal Asia – 1
[32]
aThis column shows the number of times each tactic was used by geography. If a tactic was referred to more than once (in one or more papers) regarding the
same policy then it was only counted once; however, if it was referred to more than once about different policies then this was counted separately. bIncluding
research/publications intended to undermine or misrepresent existing evidence. cRoutine use of a trade association was not counted, industry collaboration
must have been more ‘active’. dIncludes efforts to prevent the implementation of anticipated policies
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threatening ﬁnancial withdrawal) (see further details
included in the supporting information, Appendix S1).
A variety of information strategies were used across
multiple jurisdictions. These include direct [30,32,38]
and indirect [30] lobbying of policymakers and establishing
collaborative working arrangements with policymakers
[30], and a variety of efforts aimed at shaping and manipu-
lating the evidence base. The latter included commissioning,
writing or disseminating research/publications [27,32,42]
or more technical reports [32,38,42], the selective cita-
tion [27,42] and omission of evidence [30], contesting
the evidence used to support policy [27,42] and the ef-
forts to remove ‘troubling’ phrases such as ‘alcohol and
other drugs’ from the ofﬁcial lexicon [42]. The AI-funded
International Center for Alcohol Policies (ICAP) has
played a key part in such efforts: commissioning and
publishing a large number of books, monographs, brieﬁng
papers, in-depth reviews of alcohol policy issues, journal
papers and policy guides on all manner of alcohol-related
issues [42]. These activities have populated the evidence
base with non-peer-reviewed research which, among
other things, tends to highlight the health beneﬁts of
alcohol [27,42] and omit evidence of its negative health
and social effects [30].
Constituency Building was often linked to indirect lob-
bying. The AI creates front groups, astroturf organizations1
or SAOs (such as ICAP [42], the Portman Group [36], The
DrinkAware Trust [27] and the Federation onAlcohol Con-
cern of Thailand (FACT) established during the formation of
an advertising ban in 2006[32]) to lobby on its behalf
[28,32]. It also forms alliances with other industry sectors
or trade organizations [28,32,41], and civil society organi-
zations, consumers or employees [28,32] in order to oppose
public health measures [41]. In Thailand the AI worked
with groups such as the Thai Retail Association, the Hotel
Association, the Restaurant Association, the Tourism
Association and the Marketing Association of Thailand
[32], and in the US it reached out to the Federal Trade
Commission [28] and built partnerships with government
departments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
universities, researchers and physicians [28]. The AI also
uses media advocacy, such as press launches [38] and
seminars [32], to shape the news and public agenda.
Policy substitution, used to prevent the implementation
of formal marketing regulations, appears to be a key strat-
egy and has been documented globally [27–30,32,35–
38,40,42]. For example, in Lesotho, Malawi, Uganda and
Botswana SAB-Miller Africa was given de facto responsibil-
ity for drafting national alcohol policy documents [30].
These policy documents focused on self-regulatory mea-
sures, education campaigns, and gave responsibility for
the policy’s implementation to a National Alcohol Council
on which AI representatives served [30]. The promotion of
self-regulatory measures is designed to reduce political
pressure for and pre-empt formal regulation and was
identiﬁed in numerous jurisdictions. For example, we found
evidence of voluntary codes being developed and promoted
by individual companies [27,28] and by industry groups in
the UK [27,36], Ireland [38], the Netherlands [37] and
transnationally [29]. Another technique involves the
promotion of non-regulatory initiatives such as education
programmes [27,28,30,40,42] delivered through stand-
alone websites (for example, SABMiller’s www.Talking
Alcohol.com [27]) or more developed corporate social re-
sponsibility (CSR) initiatives. For example, Diageo’s Respon-
sible Drinking Fund, which in 2009 claimed to have led or
supported more than 130 prevention programmes in more
than 40 countries, covering ‘education, public awareness,
and responsible retail practices’ [28].
Using or raising the prospect of legal action against a
proposed regulation was documented only in Thailand
[32] and France [29], but there is also evidence of the AI
attempting to shape international trade and investment
agreements (speciﬁcally the General Agreement on Trade
in Services (GATS) with a view to reducing restrictions
on alcohol distribution and advertising [29]). We also
documented one example of the AI using its marketing
budget as a lever of policy inﬂuence (ﬁnancial disincentive);
in Thailand the AI ‘threatened to withdraw sports sponsor-
ship in retaliation for [an] advertising ban’ [32].
AI arguments used to inﬂuence marketing regulation
This review identiﬁed 20 separate arguments grouped into
ﬁve main frames (Table 3): ‘regulatory redundancy’
(asserting that proposed policies are unnecessary), ‘legal’
(questioning the legality of policies (the implicit cost for
government)), ‘negative unintended consequences’ (direct
and indirect compliance costs associated with proposed
policies), ‘complex policy area’ (policies, and the issues
surrounding them, are presented as highly complicated)
and ‘insufﬁcient evidence’ (questioning the strength of
evidence supporting policies) (see the supporting informa-
tion, Appendix S1 for further details).
The argument that population-level health measures
are unnecessary (regulatory redundancy frame) is devel-
oped through a wide range of mutually reinforcing
arguments which rest on industry claims of its own re-
sponsibility, its ability to market alcohol responsibly, and
its distinction between responsible and irresponsible
consumption. This frame included arguments that the AI
is responsible [27,33,34,41] (for example that industry
1Astroturf organizations can be deﬁned as ‘fake grassroots organizations usually created and/or sponsored by large corporations to support any arguments or
claims in their favor, or to challenge and deny those against them’ [44].
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Table 3 Frames and arguments used by the alcohol industry when attempting to inﬂuence marketing regulation.
Frame
Argument
Total number of
papers, by geographya(total number of uses identiﬁed)
Regulatory
redundancy (40)
Industry adheres to own self-regulation codes/self-
regulation is working well or is better than formal
regulation
Africa – 1
[31]
Asia – 1
[32]
Australasia – 3
[33–35]
Europe – 5
[27][27][27][27][27]
Transnational – 1
[43]
Industry only markets to those of legal age/is actively
opposed to minors using product
Australasia – 1
[34]
Europe – 1
[27]
N. America – 2
[28,41]
Existing regulation is satisfactory/existing regulation
is satisfactory, but requires better enforcement
Asia – 1
[32]
Australasia – 1
[33]
Europe – 3
[27][27][38]
Industry is responsible Australasia – 3
[33][33][34]
Europe – 2
[27][27]
N. America – 1
[41]
Individuals should consume product responsibly/
individual-level approach needed
Africa – 1
[30]
Australasia – 1
[34]
Europe – 2
[27][27]
N. America – 1
[41]
Transnational – 2
[42][42]
Industry has positive impact Africa – 2
[30][30]
Australasia – 2
[33,34]
Europe – 1
[27]
N. America – 2
[39,41]
Legal (8) Infringes legal rights of company (trademarks,
intellectual property, constitutionally protected free
speech (e.g. US First Amendment), international
trade agreements)
Asia – 1
[32]
Europe – 1
[27]
N. America – 1
[41]
(Continues)
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Table 3. (Continued)
Frame
Argument
Total number of
papers, by geographya(total number of uses identiﬁed)
Regulation is more extensive than necessary/
regulation is disproportionate
Europe – 3
[27][27][27]
Transnational – 1
[42]
Interferes with a free market economy Europe – 1
[27]
Negative Unintended
Consequences (16)
Economic Manufacturers The cost of compliance for manufacturers will be
high/the time required for implementation has been
underestimated
N. America – 1
[40]
Regulation will result in ﬁnancial or job losses
(among manufacturers)
Asia – 1
[32]
The regulation is discriminatory/regulation will not
affect all producers/customers equally
Australasia – 1
[34]
Europe – 3
[27][27][27]
Public revenue Regulation will cause economic/ﬁnancial problems
[for city, state, country or economic area (e.g.
European Union)]
Australasia – 1
[34]
Associated industries Regulation will result in ﬁnancial or job losses
(among retailers and other associated industries, e.g.
printing, advertising, leisure)
Asia – 1
[32]
Australasia – 1
[34]
Public health Regulation will have negative public health
consequences
Australasia – 1
[33]
Europe – 2
[27][27]
N. America – 1
[41]
Other Regulation could have other negative unintended
consequences
Europe – 2
[27][27]
Transnational – 1
[42]
Complex policy
area (13)
Complicated/beyond industry’s control Europe – 2
[27][27]
Collaboration with industry would be beneﬁcial Africa – 4
[30][30][30][30]
Australasia – 1
[33]
Europe – 2
[27,38]
Characterizing policymakers and public health actors
as authoritarian/denigrating policymakers and
public health actors
Asia – 2
[32][32]
Australasia – 2
[33,34]
(Continues)
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always encourages ‘responsible consumption’ [33] and
recognizes ‘that responsible drinking is important both to
[its] business interests and to society’s interests’ [27]), that
self-regulatory codes are ‘sufﬁcient’ [31], ‘robust’ [33],
‘effective’ [32,33], ‘extraordinarily successful’ [35], ‘faster’
[27] and ‘better’ [32], allowing the AI to deal quickly
with, and rectify, any complaints or regulatory breeches
[27,34] and close regulatory ‘gaps’ [27], and that the
industry markets only to those of legal drinking age
[27,28,34,41]. Further, the AI appears to overstate the
parallels between voluntary and statutory regulation for
example by emphasizing the independence of their (indus-
try-funded) monitoring and adjudication groups [27].
This set of arguments overlaps with claims around
personal responsibility and responsible drinking. The AI fre-
quently attempts to shift the blame for alcohol misuse to
the consumer and away from their products andmarketing
[42], arguing that there should be an individual-level focus
on education and the promotion of responsible consump-
tion [27,30,42] (and even that AI marketing itself has this
aim [41]) and that their SAOs such as the DrinkAware
Trust and the Portman Group provide information and ed-
ucation so that consumers can make ‘informed judge-
ments’ about how they use alcohol [27]; ‘misuse is
caused by certain drinkers who clearly misuse alcohol
and by some under 18s who are clearly breaking the law.
This therefore is not a problem about problem drinks but
about problem drinkers’ [27]. The focus on a small number
of alcohol misusers provides the AI with a frame that has
the potential to invalidate the current focus of health pol-
icy; the AI argues that population-level approaches, such
as taxation or restrictions on advertising, penalizes moder-
ate drinkers because of a ‘few people’who consume alcohol
in an irresponsible way and that these approaches do not
tackle alcohol misuse effectively [27,34,42]. This supports
AI claims that ‘existing regulation is satisfactory’ [27,33]
or that it simply ‘requires better enforcement’ [27,32,38];
‘the panoply of powers available to the police and local au-
thorities should be usedmuchmore effectively both against
individuals whomisuse alcohol and those whowilfully seek
to break the law in obtaining alcohol underage, as well as
against those retailers who sell alcohol irresponsibly’ [27].
The argument that regulations are disproportionate
and more extensive than necessary also rests on claims of
personal responsibility and the inherent health risks of
alcohol. In relation to health warnings in the UK it was
stated that it is not ‘necessarily appropriate to have a health
warningon a drink of alcohol. Alcohol is not like cigarettes;
it is capable of being misused but when drunk in modera-
tion it is perfectly compatible with a healthy lifestyle’
[27]. This argument has also been used regarding
minimum pricing [27], dealing with alcohol misuse [27]
and raising the legal drinking age [42].
Additionally, the AI argues that the industry, its market-
ing, and alcohol itself, has a positive impact and should
therefore not be regulated further: in Lesotho the AI argued
that when used in moderation alcohol has a ‘positive role to
play in socialisation’ and that the industry is a ‘major con-
tributor to the economy’ [30]. In Milwaukee, USA, Miller
Brewing argued that a product (beer) which forms a signif-
icant part of the local history should not be ‘demonised’
[39]. InAustralia theAI argued that ‘responsible advertising
can have a positive cultural impact’ [33] and highlighted
the importance of the AI to communities as ‘funders of
events’ [34]. And in the UK thewine company Constellation
argued that marketing could be used ‘to promote a more
responsible approach to alcohol consumption’ [27] (a very
similar statement was also made in the US by Philip Morris
(tobacco) when they owned Miller Brewing [41]).
While actual legal action is rarely reported in the
literature (see above), arguments questioning the legality
of policies to curb AI marketing are more common. These
arguments aim to shift the focus of the debate away from
public health and consumer protection, with the AI
Table 3. (Continued)
Frame
Argument
Total number of
papers, by geographya(total number of uses identiﬁed)
Insufﬁcient
evidence (8)
There is insufﬁcient evidence that the proposed policy
will work/marketing does not cause or change
behaviour (it is only used for brand selection and
capturing market share), so regulation will have no
effect
Asia – 1
[32]
Australasia – 1
[34]
Europe – 3
[27][27][38]
N. America – 1
[40]
Transnational – 2
[41,43]
aThis column shows the number of times each argument was used by geography. If an argument was referred to more than once (in one or multiple papers)
regarding the same policy then it was only counted once; however, if it was referred to more than once about different policies then this was counted separately.
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contesting advertising regulations and minimum pricing
proposals under international trade and investment agree-
ments (UK [27] and Thailand [32]), national constitutions
(USA [41]) and international law (UK [27]).
The AI often argues that regulation would have
negative unintended consequences for manufacturers
[27,32,34,40], associated industries [32,34], the public
revenue [34] and public health [27,33,41]. For example, in
both Australia [33] and the UK [27] it was argued that
advertising restrictionswouldmake it impossible to introduce
new, lower-strength products to the marketplace, thereby
stopping producers from developing and selling healthier
products, and in the US the Beer Institute argued that
mandated health warnings on alcohol products could ‘un-
dermine the credibility of other government campaigns to
provide information about serious risks which are not
commonly known’ [41]. The AI commonly avoids citing
evidence to support such claims, suggesting that the aim
may simply be to exaggerate the broader political and
economic risks associated with public health measures.
The AI also emphasizes the complications involved in
addressing problems associated with alcohol consumption
with a view to highlighting the value of industry–
government cooperation [27,30,33,38]; it claims that it
has ‘a unique capacity to access those responsible for pro-
moting and selling alcohol as well as to those who consume
their products’ [30] and that ‘partnership working can
deliver a more responsible drinking culture’ [27]. Although
the AI advocate being involved closely in policymaking and
alcohol harm reduction initiatives, they also stress that
some issues are beyond the AI’s control; for example,
preventing individual retailers from offering certain price
promotions [27] that may be deemed irresponsible. Simi-
larly, the AI regularly characterizes policymakers and public
health actors as authoritarian (‘the health lobby’s approach
is to ban everything, and if it cannot be banned, regulate it
severely’ [33]) with the Thai government being labelled a
‘dictatorship’ because of an advertising ban [32], and the
Australian government being described as a ‘“nanny state”
needlessly interfering with people’s choices’ [34].
Questioning the strength of evidence favourable to pub-
lic health policies is another common technique that has
been used to oppose advertising bans transnationally
[41], in Thailand [32], Australia [34], Ireland [38] and in
the UK [27], minimum pricing in the UK [27] and health
warning labels in the US [40]. This argument is used to
reinforce the other arguments made by the AI.
Comparison between TI and AI political activity
We identiﬁed 13 common tactics used by both the AI and
TI [5] when attempting to inﬂuence marketing regulation,
in addition to ﬁve tactics used only by the TI and seven
unique to the AI. Similarly we also identiﬁed 13 common
arguments used by both industries, along with four
arguments unique to the TI, and seven (three of which
formed the new frame ‘complex policy area’) which had
been used only by the AI (see further details included in
the supporting information, Appendix S1).
DISCUSSION
This systematic review illustrates the varied nature of AI
political activity used in attempts to inﬂuence marketing
regulation or marketing-related policy debates, and high-
lights similarities with TI political activity.
The results support the ﬁndings of the TI review [5] in
highlighting the varied nature of industry political activity
and provides further conﬁrmation that Hillman & Hitt’s
[22] model of corporate political activity, which is the most
widely cited attempt to analytically categorize the tactics
used by corporations, considerably under-represents the
range of tactics corporations use to shape policy outcomes
and debates. By identifying tactics/strategies, such as the
promotion of self-regulatory codes and raising the prospect
of litigation, the results also challenge Hillman &Hitt’s [22]
assumption that corporate political activity represents one
side of a mutually beneﬁcial exchange relationship in
which corporations offer policymakers support and infor-
mation in return for inﬂuencing policy.
The existing literature challenges the validity of many
of the arguments identiﬁed in this review (see examples
in Table 4). For example, despite the AI’s assertion that
self-regulatory codes negate the need for formal regulation
and that industry collaboration would be beneﬁcial for
policymakers, there is no evidence that self-regulation
and industry–government partnerships lead to reductions
in alcohol-related harm [19,20,25,60]. Arguing that there
is insufﬁcient evidence supporting the need to curb AI
marketing and that marketing does not change behaviour
is also false as much research has found a signiﬁcant link
between AImarketing and drinking initiation and drinking
prevalence [15–18]. Similarly, arguing that the AI does not
market to children is misleading, as research shows that AI
marketing often targets and appeals to youth and those
below legal drinking age [19,36,67,68].
This review identiﬁes marked similarities between TI
and AI political activity [5]. Differences in the observed
political activities of each industrymay be due to a number
of factors. First, raising concerns about compensation or
debating which body has power to regulate (as the TI has
done), for example, are arguments likely to be made in
the face of impending regulation by companies which have
lost the ability to exercise insider inﬂuence over policy dis-
cussions, reﬂecting greater TI regulation and differences
in alcohol and tobacco policy contexts. Second, differences
in framing may reﬂect variations in how different indus-
tries make similar points. For example, while the AI may
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Table 4 Veracity of alcohol industry arguments.
Argument Commentary and examples of evidence
Industry adheres to own self-regulation
codes/self-regulation is workingwell or is
better than formal regulation
Contrary evidence of the former. Strong contrary evidence of the latter [25,45–53]
Industry only markets to those of legal
age/is actively opposed to minors using
product
Strong contrary evidence of the former. Contrary evidence of the latter [50,53–57]
Existing regulation is satisfactory/
existing regulation is satisfactory, but
requires better enforcement
Strong contrary evidence. The available evidence indicates that the contemporary policy
environment in Europe and the United States is ineffective in limiting both young people’s
exposure to alcohol marketing and the general effect of marketing on alcohol-related harm
[17,47,54,56,58]
Industry is responsible Strong contrary evidence. Proxy measures of responsibility such as young people’s exposure to
alcohol marketing [54] and the weaknesses of industry self-regulation [25,47] contradict
claims of industry responsibility
Individuals should consume product
responsibly/individual-level approach
needed
Partially supported. There is some evidence of the effectiveness of individual-level
interventions. Controlled trials of brief alcohol interventions, for example, have reported
primarily positive outcomes on weekly drinking and a range of alcohol-related problems [59].
However, this argument is used to imply that population-based measures are either ineffective
or less effective than individual-level interventions. Studies of the relative effectiveness of
different types of policy interventions [17,60] indicate that there is strong contrary evidence of
this contention
Industry has positive impact No evidence/not researched. This assertion rests on narrow claims of social beneﬁts associated
with alcohol and the alcohol industry. There are no systematic analyses of the aggregate costs
and beneﬁts of current levels of alcohol consumptions (and, by implication, the alcohol
industry as presently constituted)
Infringes legal rights of company
(trademarks, intellectual property,
constitutionally protected free speech
(e.g. US First Amendment), international
trade agreements)
No evidence/not researched
Regulation is more extensive than
necessary/regulation is disproportionate
Strong contrary evidence [17,25,54,56,61]
Interferes with a free market economy Equivocal. Restrictions on alcohol marketing are designed to manage externalities associated
with the alcohol sector
The cost of compliance for
manufacturers will be high/the time
required for implementation has been
underestimated
No evidence/not researched. There is no publicly available, independently veriﬁed evidence of the
compliance costs that accompany marketing regulation
Regulation will result in ﬁnancial or job
losses (among manufacturers)
No evidence/not researched. There is no publicly available, independently veriﬁed evidence
linkingalcohol regulation to jobs losses in the industry. In principle, marketing restrictionsmay
negatively affect employment in the alcohol and advertising sectors. Jobs losses that occur as a
result of reduced earnings among alcohol producers (resulting from lower consumption) are
likely to be offset by the creation of jobs in other parts of the economy which occurs when
money which would otherwise be spent on alcohol is disbursed on other products
The regulation is discriminatory/
regulation will not affect all producers/
customers equally
Equivocal. Marketing regulation need not be discriminatory if properly designed. However, its
effects on producers and consumers is not likely to be equally felt
Regulation will cause economic/
ﬁnancial problems (for city, state,
country or economic area (e.g. European
Union))
No evidence/not researched. There is no publicly available, independently veriﬁed evidence of
these effects
(Continues)
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not directly contest the health impacts of alcohol
consumption, questions about the degree of harm caused
by alcohol consumption are implicit in claims concerning
individual responsibility and the health beneﬁts of alcohol
consumption. Third, differences may reﬂect differences in
access to data; because of the availability of TI documents,
information on lower visibility political activity, such as
raising the prospect of legal action, is more available on
the TI. Finally, differences may reﬂect the broader inclusion
criteria used for the AI review (i.e. covering policy debates
concerning marketing regulations generally rather than
just new speciﬁc marketing policies), the inclusion of both
primary and secondary evidence in the AI review, and
differences in alcohol and tobacco policy contexts. For
example, despite not being identiﬁed in the TI review there
is evidence of the TI attempting to shape the evidence base
[69–72], inﬂuencing international regulations [73,74],
and focusing on individual responsibility [75].
Consistent with the TI review ﬁndings [5], many of the
individual arguments fall within a larger ‘cost–beneﬁt’
meta-frame which promotes the economic and social costs
of proposed public health policies and underplays their
beneﬁts. Arguments claiming that regulation is more ex-
tensive than necessary and likely to produce negative unin-
tended consequences are used to increase uncertainty
about the likely beneﬁts of regulation, and highlight the po-
tential future costs for the industry, retailers, and the public
revenue. This is also observed through the omission of a
‘health’ frame [76]; this review found little evidence of
the AI making reference to the dangers of drinking alcohol
(only in terms of references to ‘problem drinkers’),
although multiple examples of the AI highlighting the
potential health beneﬁts of alcohol consumption were iden-
tiﬁed [27,42]. The review also found that many arguments
were supported by CSR activities. CSR tends to be used
strategically by an industry to prevent the introduction of
legislation [77]. By acting as vehicles for the promotion of
arguments, CSR activities such as self-regulatory codes
work politically as agenda-setting devices which frame
issues and shape policy debates [77]. The AI’s emphasis
on CSR highlights its value in maintaining industry credi-
bility and forming relationships (CSR partnerships are
likely to create further opportunities for cooperation [78])
ahead of regulation.
Table 4. (Continued)
Argument Commentary and examples of evidence
Regulation will result in ﬁnancial or job
losses (among retailers and other
associated industries, e.g. printing,
advertising, leisure)
No evidence/not researched. There is no publicly available, independently veriﬁed evidence of the
compliance costs that accompany marketing regulation
Regulation will have negative public
health consequences
No evidence/not researched. There is no evidence to suggest that alcohol restrictions will have
aggregate negative public health consequences
Regulation could have other negative
unintended consequences
No evidence/not researched. Risks of negative unintended consequences resulting from policy
innovation cannot be discounted. The important policy questions, however, concern the
probability of these risks and whether negative outcomes associated with policy innovation
outweigh its social beneﬁts. There is no publicly available, independently veriﬁed evidence on
these issues
Complicated/beyond industry’s control Contrary evidence. Alcohol-related harm is multiple-causal. However, when viewed against
studies on the relationship between marketing and consumption (see above) studies outlining
the volume [46] and focus of industrymarketing [56,62] suggest that marketing is a key driver
of aggregate levels of consumption and, therefore, alcohol-related harm
Collaboration with industry would be
beneﬁcial
Contrary evidence [47,63,64]
Characterizing policymakers and public
health actors as authoritarian/
denigrating policymakers and public
health actor
Unable to comment
There is insufﬁcient evidence that the
proposed policy will work/marketing
does not cause or change behaviour (it is
only used for brand selection and
capturing market share), so regulation
will have no effect
Strong contrary evidence [16,17,65,66]
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Strengths and limitations
This review has a number of limitations. First, although a
broad search strategy and search string was used when
initially identifying papers it is still possible that some
relevant papers may have been missed. To minimize this,
we worked with a librarian, searched online research
repositories, and contacted experts in the ﬁeld to identify
additional papers. Second, interpretive coding of argu-
ments and tactics is ultimately subjective. To mitigate this,
all three authors reviewed and re-reviewed the coding at
various points during the systematic review process and
second-reviewed all the included papers to ensure consis-
tency. Third, the identiﬁcation of tactics and arguments,
and the jurisdictions in which they are used, is dependent
upon the available literature, its quality, and any publica-
tion bias. As such, it is possible that some tactics and
arguments are not identiﬁed in or used more frequently
than the literature would suggest. Closely related to this
is the fact that the review focuses only onmarketing policy,
and the AI may use a more diverse set of tactics and
arguments in other policy areas. For these reasons the
number of papers listed next to each tactic and argument
(the ‘count’) should be used only as an indication of the
reliance the AI places on particular tactics and arguments.
Finally, due to limited information in the papers identiﬁed,
it was not possible to reliably determine which tactics or
arguments were most persuasive or successful in defeating
marketing-related regulations.
The main strength of this review is its systematic ap-
proach, which provides a comprehensive and geogra-
phically diverse overview of AI tactics and arguments. Its
attempt to rigorously categorize industry strategies/tactics
and frames/arguments is, to our knowledge, along with
our ﬁrst paper [5], the ﬁrst attempt to do so. While care
needs to be taken in assuming that tactics and arguments
used in one jurisdictionwill be used elsewhere, this and our
previous review [5] suggest that the ﬁndings will be
broadly applicable across different jurisdictions.
Implications for policy, practice and research
This systematic review has identiﬁed strategies/tactics and
frames/arguments used by the AI between 1990 and
2013 to shape policy debates and prevent the implementa-
tion of restrictions on alcohol marketing. Policymakers need
to be aware of these in order to understand how the AI may
try to inﬂuence the policymaking process, and public health
actors can use this information to prepare effective counter
strategies and arguments. This review has also conﬁrmed
substantial commonalities between AI and TI political
activity: particularly the use of obfuscating tactics such as
misrepresenting the evidence base and using third parties
and front groups to lobby. The similarities suggest that
alcohol policy may beneﬁt from reproducing efforts in
tobacco control aimed at excluding corporate actors from
the policy process and enhancing transparency. Additionally,
as differences between the two industries are likely to be due,
at least in part, to differences in alcohol and tobacco policy
contexts, the ﬁndings from the TI review [5] may provide
an indication of how AI political activity is likely to
develop under conditions of increased regulatory risks.
The current review has further developed the frame-
works for classifying corporate political activity outlined
in the earlier TI review [5], and shown the policy and
scholarly value of applying them to other industries. Future
work could apply these frameworks to other industries or
policy areas. Based on limitations in the studies reviewed,
we again recommend that future research on corporate
policy inﬂuence should, where possible, include contextual
information, ensure all claims made within the paper are
supported by empirical evidence, and that the receptivity
of stakeholders to and the success or failure of individual
tactics and arguments are recorded.
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